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Making a homefront without a
battlefront: The manufacturing of
domestic enemies in the early Cold War
culture 
Jean-Paul Gabilliet
1 Although the Cold War was an undeclared conflict without actual battlefront one of its
earliest charcteristics was the emergence in the United States of a homefront-based “war
culture” targetting domestic enemies. 1947 witnessed the rise in news media of anxieties
over alleged threats to domestic stability: in the first few months of the year, a Crime
Scare reactivating pre-war concerns about the Mob and, in the summer, the first reported
UFO sightings. In both cases the media and public responses to these events evidenced a
collective interest triggered by news stories that singled out exaggerated or fictitious
domestic threats and produced scapegoats (ethnic mobsters and alleged extra-terrestrial
visitors)  that  implicitly  confirmed the  Americans’  perception  of  their  country  as  an
embattled homefront.
2 In 1945 most Americans looked forward to the postwar time as an age when stability and
prosperity would finally thrive after the fifteen-year-long hiatus of the Depression and
Second World War. The hardships of the 1930s, which were very real — unemployment
hit a quarter of the white working population at the worst time of the depression — while
the  social  changes  that  became  increasingly  conspicuous  under  the  Roosevelt
administrations,  such  as  women’s  employment  and  juvenile  delinquency,  fostered
collective  self-representations  of  a  fragilized  and  threatened  society  that  could  find
salvation only in the return to an ideal, if entirely mythical, status quo. The idea that
loomed largest in the period’s popular culture was that of an implicit return to normality,
to  the  prosperity  of  the  idealized “Jazz  Age” or  “Roaring Twenties.”  This  belief  was
shored up by the consensus about Americanism, i.e. the equation of American collective
identity with a superior moral value system and uniquely abundant American way of life.
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In its most extreme manichaean expression Americanism was singling out Communism as
the  epitome  of  un-Americanism  and  economic  failure  while  subscribing  to  a  neo-
Victorian public ethos based on the wholesale promotion of the nuclear family ideal, the
sexual  division of  labor  between female  homemakers  and male  breadwinners,  and a
worldview of “domestic containment” to use Elaine Tyler May’s phrase.1
3 In his classic study The Culture of the Cold War Stephen J. Whitfield documented the rise in
post-World War II US culture of a consensual public opinion that prompted Americans to
unconditionally believe in the necessity to protect themselves from domestic enemies, a
multifarious notion that referred to both American and foreign Communists but also any
and all individuals or groups liable to be described as “subversive.” Although the Cold
War was not an armed conflict per se but a half-century-long power struggle between two
geopolitical blocs it still provides us with a very interesting example of an era in which a
country, the United States of America, developed a corresponding “war culture.” This
complex notion2 refers to all collective representations correlated to the state of war
which a given country experiences at a given time and the practices shaping the social
world that stem from it. This definition predicates the prevalence of reality effects: a war
culture may arise and grow in a country that is not experiencing warfare on its soil. 
4 In this respect the USA may be regarded as the emblematic example of a country where
successive war cultures thrived long after it was last ravaged by armed conflict – as in the
Revolutionary  War  (1776-1783),  its  War  of  1812  (1812-1815),  following  the  Civil  War
(1861-1865),  the 1898 Spanish-American War, and the First and Second World Wars –
which,  though  geographically  distant  conflicts,  nevertheless  impacted  American
collective representations by generating mechanisms of enemy identification, homefront-
battlefront dialectics, and postwar celebration rituals.3 The specificity of the Cold War in
its early phase, i.e. until the Korean War broke out in the summer of 1950, was its ability
to fuel a war culture that, in the absence of a clearly identified battlefront, relied on the
implicit notion of an endangered homefront threatened by a multipronged fifth column.
5 1947 is considered by most historians of the United States as the year when the Cold War
began with the implementation of the “Truman Doctrine” to contain the propagation of
world Communism, which give rise to the anti-communist hysteria of the following years.
Nevertheless this essentially political periodization deserves to be nuanced in the light of
arguably “minor” historical facts which still convey particular significance in the context
of cultural history and which will be the focus of the following analysis. 1947 was the year
when a low-key Crime Scare occurred in the wake of a renewed surge of media interest in
organized crime and when the first UFO sightings were reported in the summer. In both
cases these phenomena triggered different public and governmental reactions that can be
analyzed in retrospect against the backdrop of the Cold War’s endangered-homefront
dynamics. The United States entered the Cold War not only through political agency but
also because the American population were mentally disposed,  if  not predisposed,  to
enter this momentous phase of their history. As noted at the time, it was the “Age of
Anxiety”.
 
1. The 1947 Crime Scare
6 The Crime Scare publicized by a substantial segment of the American press early in 1947
is forgotten in most US history books. The surge of media interest in organized crime that
occurred  in  the  first  half  of  the  year  should  be  placed  in  a  double  context.  Since
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Prohibition (1920-1933) the press had typically described organized crime as a nationwide
conspiracy  engineered  by  foreign  criminals—essentially  Irish,  Jewish,  and  Italian
immigrants.  Federal  authorities,  on the contrary,  denied how “organized” it  was and
insisted –  via  the  influence  of  FBI  Director  J.  Edgar  Hoover  in  particular  –  that  the
delinquency the country should worry about was really a matter of various examples of
“Public Enemy Number One”. The view of a nationwide conspiracy engineered by foreign
criminals ironically contradicted the official position of both the New Deal administrators
and the FBI itself,  which blamed the permanent rise of crime statistics not on ethnic
mobsters  but  on  American-born  bandits  (à  la Bonnie  and  Clyde  or  John  Dillinger).
America’s  highwaymen and  women were  presented  by  federal  authorities  as  former
juvenile  delinquents  produced  by  the  weakening  of  parental  authority,  a  persistent
concern in the traumatic contexts of the Depression and World War II.4
7 The second important contextual element was the then current debate on the nationwide
legalization  of  gambling.  Since  the  late  1930s  Americans’  rising  purchasing  power
(following the end of the depression and simultaneous onset of the wartime economy that
restricted the availability of consumer durables into the second half of the 1940s) had
mechanically led to an increase in illegal gambling. Millions of dollars were spent on off-
track race-betting and local lotteries (numbers, policy) thanks to which even the poorest
households could hope to hit the jackpot. The huge income thus generated was pocketed
by  gangsters  and  partially  used  to  bribe  local  law  enforcement  into  looking  away,
partially used for self-serving, communitarian philanthropic projects (in the manner of
the old,  urban political  “machines”).  While many in the postwar context called for a
moralization of society, the economic arguments voiced by the supporters of legalization
ran up against  the moral  arguments of  very well-organized lobbies,  such as citizens’
crime commissions or religious associations.5
8 After years of relative discretion organized crime made headlines again in the first days
of 1947. According to “The Heirs of Capone,” an article published in the January 13 issue
of  Newsweek,  Al  Capone’s  criminal  empire  was  once  again  a  hotbed of  violence.  The
Chicago police had made public the 1946 testimony of James M. Ragen, the gangster who
controlled Continental Press, one of the illegal wire news services that provided off-track
information on dog and horse races. Such services were very lucrative operations for
which gangsters were prepared to fight with extreme violence. In his 98-page testimony
to the Cook County District Attorney Ragen revealed he had received death threats from
members  of  the  former  Capone  outfit  who  supported  his  main  competitor  Trans-
American. This information was all the more sensational and apparently relevant since
Ragen was murdered in mysterious circumstances soon after testifying and the two rival
news services subsequently merged (not without a great deal of mob violence) under the
leadership of Jake Guzik, a former Capone acolyte who had risen in the organization’s
ranks since the boss’s demise. On top of this the Newsweek piece described Guzik’s attempt
to bribe a Dallas, Texas, sheriff-elect and police lieutenant when he tried to take control
of the local gambling scene. According to this story the Chicago Outfit seemed to be back
in business with a vengeance. By pure coincidence it was back in the limelight two weeks
later: on January 25 Al Capone died of a stroke at the age of 48 in his Palm Beach mansion
where he had lived as a recluse since leaving Alcatraz in 1939.6
9 If newspapers and magazines devoted considerable copy to Capone in February another
prominent  mobster  attracted public  attention two months  later.  In  a  lengthy article
published in two consecutive issues of the weekly muckraker magazine Collier’s in April,
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Herbert Asbury, a journalist specializing in underworld affairs, presented the career of
Frank Costello. Unlike his famous peers Lucky Luciano and Meyer Lansky, this key figure
of the New York City mob had remained out of law’s reach since 1926. For a quarter
century Costello had methodically constructed the public image of an Italian-American
philanthropist  with close ties to the local  Democratic Party machine — which meant
criminal collusion with Tammany Hall’s Irish-controlled patronage system. Asbury’s very
well-informed exposé described how for two decades Costello’s exemplary daily life had
concealed the behind-the-scenes activities of  the crime family formerly led by Lucky
Luciano and Vito Genovese. The revelations about his life upset Costello so much that—
more  than  a  half-century  before  HBO’s  Tony  Soprano—he  eventually  consulted  a
psychiatrist in 1948.7 But his health issues were minor by comparison with those of his
long-time Jewish associate Benjamin “Bugsy” Siegel,  who was found murdered in his
mistress Virginia Hill’s Beverly Hills home on June 20. Also at issue here was not just lurid
gang tales  and infighting,  but  the newer,  postwar  factor  of  these  criminals’  need to
convert illegitimate to legitimate businesses and,  while doing so,  create new ways to
launder illegal profits and secure tax evasion.
10 The attention paid by the media to organized crime in the first half of 1947 had several
objective consequences. In popular cultural terms, for instance, the comic book industry
experienced a boom in crime titles whereas this genre had been marginally successful
since its  appearance in 1942.8 This  domain had previously been mainly the realm of
American movies  as  the  gangster  or  criminal  film,  starting with D.  W.  Griffith’s  The
Musketeers of Pig Alley (1912), a medium which had virtually monopolized the production
and diffusion of criminal legends in twentieth century US popular culture (preceded by
American dime novels telling city tales of high life and low life crime in the second half of
the nineteenth century).
11 In  the  political  field  several  significant  decisions  were  made  in  postwar  America
regarding crime. The California Legislature finally appropriated funds for a special study
group  on  organized  crime  first  requested  by  Governor  Earl  Warren  in  1945.  In
Washington,  DC Attorney General  Tom Clark’s Justice Department created a so-called
“racket  squad”  to  be  sent  to  major  cities  preparatory  to  initiating  grand  jury
investigations. Across the country the various crime commissions, local citizens’ groups
monitoring underworld activities, developed renewed visibility and started growing in
number.9
12 Although underworld activities had never ceased since the highly publicized mob trials of
the 1930s — featuring such big names as Capone and Luciano and driven on the East Coast
by New York County’s District Attorney Thomas Dewey — the year 1947 witnessed an
actual, if subdued, panic about the alleged rebirth of the Mafia. It triggered off a new
surge  of  public  concern  that  eventually  culminated  in  1950-51  with  the  then
unprecedented  media  coverage  of  the  Tennessee  Democrat  Estes  Kefauver’s  “Special
Senate  Committee  on  Organized  Crime  in  Interstate  Commerce,”  whose  televised
hearings were the very first politically significant use of the TV screen in US politics.
13 The American public’s post-war responses to the resurgence of organized crime in 1947
call for two remarks. First, note the paradox : the media engaged in a campaign touched
off by facts of admittedly limited gravity — neither bloodshed nor civilian casualties were
deplored as often happened during Prohibition. Second, whereas the view of organized
crime as a foreign conspiracy eating away at the US economy was widely disseminated in
the  press  in  the  1930s,  it  was  not  until  the  end  of  the  following  decade  that  most
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Americans responded to the stigmatization of  mobsters  — next  to Communists  — as
scapegoats of the troubles experienced by US society. (And one should note in passing
that there was soon a spill over in this renewed fear about mobsters which was affiliated
to a new social anxiety about young, white, middle-class American teenagers becoming
juvenile delinquents – as in James Dean’s movie Rebel Without a Cause of 1955.) By the early
1950s the Kefauver Committee, whose actual goal was to serve the Tennessee Senator’s
presidential  ambitions,  managed to instil  into US public opinion a view of  organized
crime  as  a  national  conspiracy  engineered  by  foreign  gangsters  —  whereas  all
independent  investigations  conducted  by  journalists  or  academics  underscored  the
largely local nature of this criminality. In the late 1940s’ Crime Scare the American public
seemed less prepared to listen to the truth than to propagandist interpretations diffused
by opinion-makers. Both gangsters and Communists were literally reshaped as scapegoats
for various societal issues in a period of excessive susceptibility to collective anxieties.
 
2. The first UFOs
14 Yet even collective anxieties must be put in their historical context.10 Although flying
saucers were among the first cultural products of the Cold War era they, unlike mobsters,
did not elicit much response from the American public at first. According to a June 25,
1947 Associated Press dispatch, Kenneth Arnold, a young pilot, spotted nine unidentified
flying objects over Mount Rainier in Washington State at 3 PM the previous day.  He
estimated the saucer-shaped aircraft were flying at 1,200 mph around 10,000 feet high. In
those  days  when there  were  no  circular  airborne  vessels,  five  months  before  Chuck
Yeager broke the sound barrier in southern California on October 14, Arnold’s sighting
sounded perfectly extraordinary. Even more surprising was the multiplication of similar
testimonies across the country in the following weeks. In a July 8 statement the US Army
announced that a flying disc found by a local farmer at Roswell, New Mexico, had been
brought  to  the  local  air  base.  After  being shipped to  Fort  Worth,  Texas,  for  further
analysis, the rubber strips, tinfoil,  tough paper, sticks and flower tape making up the
“disc” turned out to be the remains of a weather balloon. This arguably unimportant
incident sparked limited media interest for a few days, just long enough for the local
Roswell Daily Record to make a couple of headlines and get the farmer who had discovered
the saucer to candidly confess that he had come across the debris by chance and never
seen anything resembling a flying saucer.
15 Early in August Jack Wilcox, an FBI agent stationed in Washington State, wrote an official
report about alleged sightings of “doughnut-shaped” flying discs off Maury Island near
Tacoma on June 21 which, he concluded, were a hoax. On July 30, a few days before Wilcox
filed his report, the USAF and FBI had initiated a cooperation program to investigate
flying disc  sightings after  General  George Schulgen,  a  Pentagon high-ranking officer,
convinced J. Edgar Hoover that the FBI should interrogate anyone who claimed to have
sighted UFOs to ensure they were not Communist sympathizers attempting to touch off
collective hysteria by taking advantage of the public’s fear of Soviet secret weapons. The
un-natural alliance of the military and the Feds petered out in less than two months when
Hoover came across a for-your-eyes-only Air Force letter which made it clear that the
Army relied on the Bureau to look into the increasingly numerous probable UFO hoaxes
while  the  military  intelligence  worked  on  the  more  “serious”  cases.  After  the  FBI
unilaterally  terminated  the  cooperation  agreement,  military  investigations  into  UFO
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sightings were handed over to “Project Sign,” a program under the supervision of Air
Materiel Command (the Army services in charge of research, development, and logistics),
which never ruled out any of the three main hypotheses to account for the phenomena—
Soviet weapons, ultra-secret US weapons, or extra-terrestrial spaceships.
16 A Gallup poll conducted from July 25 through 30, one month after Kenneth Arnold’s first
flying disc sighting, sheds light on the public’s reaction to the enigma that seemed to
matter so much to the military. To the question “Have you heard of flying saucers or read
about them?” 90% of respondents gave a positive answer. The second question “What do
you think these saucers are?” the responses were more diverse : 42% said they did not
know what they were, 29% thought they were optical illusions or mirages, 15% believed
they were secret US weapons, 10% viewed them as hoaxes, 3% as weather devices, 2% as
searchlights on airplanes, and only 1% believed they were Soviet weapons!
17 This poll undermines several present-day preconceptions about the Cold War mindset.
First it implies that the hypothesis of alien visitors was not relevant to the general public
then—a point that justifies the necessity to qualify the would-be collective panic stirred
up by Orson Welles’  War of  the  Worlds radio broadcast  a  decade before the first  UFO
sightings. Hence, US mass media was trumpeting and distorting its own effects. It also
suggests  that  in  the  summer  of  1947,  while  the  United  States  still  had  its  nuclear
monopoly, the fear of secret Soviet weapons was practically non-existent whereas the
belief  in  the  existence  of  advanced US-made weapons  was  shared by  one out  of  six
Americans.
 
3. Domestic enemies for want of a battlefront
18 What do these phenomena tell us? The feared resurgence of mob violence and the first
alleged UFO sightings are perfect examples of the representations that were to structure
the Cold War zeitgeist in the coming years. The media’s ostensible rediscovery of the Mafia
stimulated anxieties about a foreign domestic enemy engaging in clandestine activities,
largely the same anxieties as those the conservative opponents to the New Deal  had
cultivated since the previous year’s mid-term election campaign ending in a Republican
landslide in Congress. As America entered the Cold War and the public was becoming
increasingly sensitive to the issue of domestic subversion it was difficult for both FBI and
the Truman administration to continue to downplay the hold of  organized crime on
American society and economy that had been building up since the Twenties — though in
a more discreet way since the repeal of Prohibition.
19 In the summer of 1947 the impact of the first alleged UFOs on the American public was at
best limited, actually in inverse proportion to the Army intelligence’s concerns about the
true nature of “saucers.” Only after 1949 did the number of stories about encounters with
extra-planetary aliens start increasing, along with radio shows, movies or comic books
dealing with invasions of the planet by Martians and their likes. In US cinema alone a few
outstanding examples would be the beguiling The Day The Earth Stood Still  (1951),  the
chilling movie The Thing (1951), and the truly spooky socio-political scifi thriller Invasion
of  the  Body  Snatchers (1956).  The  chronological  discrepancy  between  the  initial
phenomenon  and  its  widespread  assimilation  by  popular  culture  likely  results  from
gradual  changes  in  the  American  mindset  following  the  ending  of  the  US  nuclear
monopoly (August 1949), the founding of the People’s Republic of China (October 1949)
and the Korean War (summer 1950). This discrepancy may also be understood as culture
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lag: the difference between the appearance of a true or false phenomenon and the time it
takes for a society to catch up and deal with it.
20 Moreover,  the  flying  saucer  sightings  of  1947  mattered  little  to  the  public  because
Americans  had  not  experienced  wartime  bombings,  unlike  their  distant  European
neighbors, but had internalized trust in the United States’ nuclear monopoly after the
destructions of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. Only when the Soviets finally
mastered  atomic  power  did  flying  saucers  assume  a  new  significance  as  vessels
supposedly carrying extra-terrestrial  weaponry and life-forms.  This  representation of
UFOs seems self-evident to early 21st-century Westerners, particularly those raised on a
steady diet of CGI-laced big-budget science-fiction Hollywood movies. But it was foreign
to the American public of 1947 who were indoctrinated into dreading a domestic enemy
in disguise on US soil rather than unidentified (albeit necessarily alien) foes swooping
down from the skies.
21 The scapegoating of  genuine and virtual  disruptive  elements  has  been a  constant  in
American history, as Michael Rogin demonstrated when he tracked down the recurrence
of “political demonology” phenomena in the United States since the country’s origin.11 In
this respect the media and public responses to these admittedly minor events of 1947
perpetuated traditional reactions to “sensational” news stories. Beyond their anecdotal
and often entertaining dimensions the Crime Scare and UFO sightings of 1947 exemplify
how the American early Cold War culture manufactured domestic enemies,  either by
putting  in  the  limelight  actual  subversives  that had  inconspicuously  infiltrated  the
country’s  economic  and  political  fabric  for  decades  or  by  echoing  the  analysis  of
inexplicable atmospheric phenomena as possible signs of extra-terrestrial life. In both
cases the facts and incidents highlighted by American media were interpreted by the
press, the authorities, the public and the popular culture as phenomena that confirmed
the implicit necessity for Americans to view their country as an embattled homefront and
act accordingly. They were also preludes to the subsequent victimization into the 1950s of
writers,  academics,  artists,  intellectuals,  homosexuals,  essentially  all  the  individuals
liable to public stigmatization not because of any crimes they had committed but of their
failure to comply with the appearances of the mainstream American way of life.
22 As specifically post-war phenomena the Crime scare and UFO sightings exemplified no
fresh start in public paranoia however. They were rather classic collective responses to
the  emergence  of  elements  potentially  disruptive  to  the  national  well-being  and
prospective long-term prosperity. It is worthwhile noting that the temporal anchorings
of both issues were poles apart. Mob-related anxieties were rooted in the not-too-distant
pre-war  past  of  the  Twenties  and  Thirties  and  ethnic  gangsters  had  been  largely
overshadowed by Japanazis as the nation’s most convincing public enemies during the
war years. Conversely UFOs, which were not yet futuristic mainstays of popular culture,
initally stirred concern mostly among the military whereas the public was still basking in
the confidence of a perpetual US nuclear monopoly.  To make a final comparison the
Crime Scare was a resurgence, a sort of collective return of the repressed in which society
peered  into  itself  at  real  bogeymen  who  had  been  shunning  publicity  with  what
amounted to the active complicity of federal authorities for over fifteen years. The early
flying disc sightings, on the contrary, adumbrated future visions of armed menace, in
which  threats  would  assume  the  form  of  extra-powerful  flying  weapons  instead  of
invading armies. In sum post-war Americans experienced the transition from hot war to
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cold war in the context of a permanently reconfigured war culture as they looked inward
at organized crime and outward to strange vessels allegedly zooming across the skies.
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